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I. INTRODUCTION
The profit-maximizing goal is demanded by sheer economic survival
of the firm in a hypothetical world of pure competition. With the
recognition that pure competition is not the general rule of the market,
the concern with other goals becomes possible. Beyond the minimal need
for survival, a certain margin or "slack" can be afforded by the firm to
satisfy desires other than, or in addition to, that of profits. Alter-
native theories of the firm based on various simple or complex objective
functions have therefore been developed in the literature.
In many new approaches to the theory of the firm, the traditional
assumption of the "entrepreneur" has been found to be deficient con-
sidering the internal organization of the modern firm. When two or
more persons with interests in the firm are taken into consideration,
the question of possible diversity of goals must be resolved. Different
goals of the firm bear different normative implications for the
different groups of people related to the firm, including consumers who
belong to the firm's clientele and employees who supply the human element
in the process of production. The consideration of alternative goals
therefore involve the question of distribution which is at the heart of
political economy.
This paper offers a comparison of the normative implications of two
alternative goals of the firm: profit maximization (PM) and sales-
o
revenue maximization (SEM)
.
For a quick review of alternative approaches to the theories of
the firm, see, for instance, P. Yeung [3].
William J. Baumol [1].

By relaxing the restrictive market conditions of pure competition, the
comparison will be made in terms of the following criteria: (i) stock-
holders' equity, (ii) consumers' welfare, (iii) the level of employment,
and (iv) the stability of employment.
A simple model of the firm to be used for our analysis will first
be described (section II). Then the comparative effects of PM and SRM
at the firm level will be discussed (section III). Lastly, some further
implications will be considered (section IV)
.

II. THE MODEL3
Suppose the firm produces commodity X by means of two Inputs, A au<-
B. Let the production function X = f(A, B) possess the usual properties;
twice differentiate, positive but diminishing marginal productivities,
constant returns to scale, and constant elasticity of substitution (a).
Suppose A represents labor, and that the wage rate (p ) is exoge-3
nously determined, say, by unionism. Assume that the price-elasticity
of supply (e) of the other factor is a non-negative constant, and that
the demand function facing the firm is downward- sloping given by X.pn =
h, o<n<«, where p represents price, h and n are paranei-.er'i, n bein<» the
(finite) price-elasticity of demand.
Some of the properties of this model, which will be of special
interest to us in this paper, should be noted. Ff.rst, within the non-
trivial range for the firm operating under either PX or SUM, it has bi an
fo-. id that l<n<°°. This implies that sales R (= X.p) is a raonotonically
increasing function of X, and chat, except in the trivial case where
the profit constraint ir under SBM coincides with the maximum profit
level under FM, R ?: d \ are higher aad ? is lower under SUM than under
PM.
A
3
This model has been used in a different but related context in
P. Yeung [4]
4
Ibid.

Second, the elasticity of derived demand under PM is found to be
x =
. 3A_.fft i o(n+e) + ek(n-a)
3p A n+e - k(n-a)
and under SRM it is found to be
3A Pa
n*
o
{cT(l+e) + ek(l-o)} - R{o(n+e) + ek(n-a)
}
3p~"A~
=
nir { 1+e - k(l-o)} - R{ n+e - k(n-a)
A * fA
where k= —-— represents the share of labor in the production of X.
Third, two "rules" of derived demand under SRM can be deduced from
the model. They are as follows: "Under sales-revenue maximization (where
the demand for the firm's product is elastic and other normal conditions
obtain), (i) the elasticity of derived demand fcr a factor of production
is likely to be smaller, the greater is the volume of sales of the
product, and (ii) the elasticity of derived demand for a factor of pro-
duction is likely to be greater, the greater is the target level of
profits." 6
5
Ibid.
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Ibid.

III. COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF PM AND SRt-i
The effects of embracirg the alternative goals of profit-maximiza-
tion and constrained sales-revenue maximization by the firm can now be
analysed. This will be undertaken in terms of their partial effects on
(i) stockholders' equity, (ii) consumers' welfare, (iii) the level of
employment, and (iv) the stability of employment. These will be con-
sidered in turn.
(i) Effect on stockholders' equity
To make the comparison between PM and SEM non-trivial, it should be
assumed, as in Figure 1, that the maximum profits under PM is greater
than the constrained level of profits tt under SRM. At the same time,
it should be observed that sales (R) is greater under SBM than under PK-
( sales)
vr (profits)
Figure 1

A trade-off is thua possible between sales (R) and profits (it), depending
on the utilities which the management or the stockholders of the firm
attach to these goals, because they may be interpreted as signifying
market power (market share) or the long-term vs. the short-term financial
strength of the firm, and so on. Of course profits (PM) would be pre-
ferred from the strictly short-term standpoint in terms of returns to
stockholders' equity only.
(ii) Effect on consumers' welfare
It was noted in section II that sales (R) and output (X) are higher
and price (p) is lower under SRM than under PM. The lower price under
Figure 2
SRM (p in Figure 2) means that consumers' surplus is increased by SRM
s
over its PM level. SRM therefore favors the consumer.
See, for example, Fritz Machlup [2, esp. pp. 21, 23]

(iii) Effect on the level of employment
Since the level of output is higher under SRM (X in Figure 2)
,
s
than under PM (X ) , the level of employment of factor A (labor) is also
higher under SRM than under PM. This would tend to be more so if the
non-negative price-elasticity of supply of B, the other factor, is small.
(iv) Effect on the stability of employment
From the second of the new "rules" of derived demand noted in
section II, the elasticity of derived demand must be smaller under SRM
than under PM, since profits (it) are lower in the former ca3e. This
implies that the employment of labor by the firm under conditions of
union pressure to increase wages would tend to be more stable under SRM
than under PM.
However, in dealing with the question of employuent of workers, the
demand for the firm's product should also be considered. From the
formulae for the two elasticities of derived demand, X and X' under PM
and SRM respectively (see section II) , it should oe observed that X is
independent of X or p, whxl^ X' depends on R (= X.p). Thus any change
in demand for X would affect X' under SRM, but not X under PM, provided
the other parameters in the formulas remain unchanged. Under these
conditions, a shift in R means a change in the parameter h when n is
given in the demand function. Other things being equal, h and R are
positively related. When the demand for X increases (dh>0) , X' decreases
according to the first of the two "rules" of derived demand. On the
other hand, when the demand for X decreases (dh<0) , X' increases.
Consequently, in a period of stagflation when demand for the output

decreases accompanied by mounting pressures on wages, the effect on lr.y-
8
off of workers becomes increasingly severe. This can, however, be
partially offset by lowering the target level of profits (n )
.
However, the second of the "rules" of derived demand still inti-
mates that X>A'
.

IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
In comparing the effects of profit maximization and sales-revenue
maximization, our analysis has revealed that under normal conditions a
change from PM to SRM would help to Increase the level of not only sales,
but also production and employment, while it would help to lower the
price level and to raise consumers' surplus. These effects are of
course partial effects, since the analysis is undertaken at the micro-
level. However by simple extension, the above findings may be inter-
preted as constituting a prlma-facie case that the same effects are
likely to carry over to the macro-level, provided of course that
additional people in the labor force are willing to be employed, and
that the friction in getting them absorbed can be overcome.
As the SRM goal is being adopted in place of PM, consumption
expenditure would tend to increase in two ways. First, it is due to the
increase in sales of the new SRM firms. Second, by assuming that stock-
holders in general consist of the richer people of society, a change
from PM to SRM would tend to distribute income from this group to the
poorer labor force. This would iend to raise the overall marginal
propensity to consume, which has the effect of raising national income
and thus consumption expenditure via the multiplier effect.
While SRM at the firm level helps to lower prices, it should also
be helpful in curbing or slowing inflation at the macro-level. Although
the overall long-run effects of SRM (vs. PM) cannot be ascertained
without complete Information about the income and price elasticities of
demand for final goods and services, it can be seen that its short-run

10
effects tend to help the economy especially during periods of stagflation
by resolving in part the Phillips dilemma.
Finally, in terms of distributional effects, SRM (vs. PM) tends to
favor consumerism and benefit the poorer working force over the richer
owners of productive resources.
There is therefore much to recommend SRM over PM. Of course, such
a recommendation is predicated on the assumption that it is addressed
to public-minded firms or industries which can afford a margin beyond
the most fundamental need for economic survival.

11
PEFERENCES
[1] William J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth (New York:
Macmillan, 1959).
[2] Fritz Machlup, "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavorial,
Managerial," American Economic Review , vol. 57 (March, 1967),
pp. 1-33.
[3] P. Yeung, "Unifying Elements in the Theories of the Firm,"
Quarterly Review of Economics & Business , vol. 9 (Winter, 1969),
pp. 21-8.
[4] P. Yeung, "A Note on the Rules of Derived Demand," Quarterly
Journal of Economics , vol. 86 (August, 1972), forthcoming.







